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Abstract: What do we see in a mirror? There is an ongoing debate whether mirrors 
present us with images of objects or whether we see, through the mirror, the objects 
themselves. Roberto Casati has recently argued that there is a categorical difference 
between images and mirror-reflections. His argument depends on the observation that 
mirrors, but not paintings, are sensitive to changes in the observer’s prospective. In our 
paper we scrutinize Casati’s argument and present a modal argument that shows that it 
cannot establish this conclusion. We suggest that Casati’s line of reasoning suffers from 
the fact that he does not take dynamic images, i.e., images that change over time, into 
account.  
 





Half-jokingly, Plato compared mirrors to accomplished painters. Leonardo da Vinci, on the 
other hand, was quite serious when he urged his fellow artists to take mirrors as masters and 
touchstones.1 This was based on the assumption that the images paintings present to us are 
 
1 ‘How the mirror is master of painters. When you want to see if your painting altogether conforms with the thing 
portrayed in nature, take a mirror, and make the live thing reflect in it, and compare the thing reflected with your 
painting, and consider well whether the subject of one and the other likeness conform to each other. Above all the mirror 
is to be taken as master, I mean the flat mirror, inasmuch as on its surface things have similarities with paintings in many 
parts; that is you see a painting done on a plane show things that seem in relief, and a mirror on a plane does the same; a 
painting is just a surface, a mirror is the very same; a painting is intangible, insofar as that which is round and distinct 
cannot be circled with hands, and mirrors do the same. Mirrors and paintings show the similarity of things surrounded by 
shadow and light, and one and the other appear well beyond their surface. And if you know that a mirror through features 
and shadows and lights makes things seem to stand out for you, and your having among your colours shadows and light 
more powerful that those of the mirror, of course, if you know how to compose them well together, your picture too will 
seem itself a natural thing, seen in a great mirror’ (Leonardo da Vinci, Trattato della Pittura (Milano: Società Tipografica 
Classici Italiani, 1804), 165f, translated by R. Casati). See also Vivian Mizrahi ‘Mirrors and Misleading Appearances.’ 




precisely of the same kind as what we can see in mirrors. The assumption became much of 
a common place for at least the subsequent two centuries and retains its appeal to this day. 
Zeno Vendler for one endorses both the spirit and the letter of Leonardo’s claim. 
 
We see [mirror images], yet they are nothing in the physical world. The mirror 
image of my face appears behind the mirror, yet there is nothing there but bricks.2 
 
The main competing theory concerning mirrors is that, in them, far from seeing images, we 
see the reflected objects themselves. Roberto Casati3 has recently presented an argument 
based on commonplace observations to show that mirrors are quite unlike paintings, in so 
far as what we see in mirrors are not images. If the argument is at all convincing, Leonardo 
was decidedly off-target and so is Vendler, among many others. We shall argue that Casati’s 
argument has some major flaws.  
 
Let us retrace the steps of Casati’s argument. First, he divides up theorists attempting to 
answer the question, What is it that we see in mirrors?, into two types: the Multipliers and 
the Unifiers. Multipliers contend that what is seen in mirrors are images of the objects 
situated on our side of the mirror, not the objects themselves. Thus, they multiply the entities 
that are there to be seen.4 According to the Unifiers, on the other hand, what we see in 
mirrors are the reflected objects themselves. Such ontological austerity is to be applauded. 
However, there is a price to pay for it. Objects are seen in mirrors as being located in places 
different from where they really are — e.g., one sees oneself as behind the mirror, despite 
one’s being in front of it — and as having properties different from those they really have — 
e.g., when Captain Hook, who has a hook on his left arm, looks at himself in the mirror, he 
 
pictures and mirrors are similar because […] they create the illusion that there is a three-dimensional reality beyond their 
surface’ (365f). 
2 Zeno Vendler, “The Ineffable Soul,” in The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate, ed. R. Warner and T. 
Szubka, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 317–328: 322. 
3 Roberto Casati, “Mirrors, Illusions and Epistemic Innocence,” in Perceptual Illusions. Philosophical and Psychological 
Essays, ed. C. Calabi (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 192–201. 
4 Among the Multipliers, Casati lists Ned Block, “Why do Mirrors Reverse Right/Left but not Up/Down,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 71 (1974): 259-277. Mohan Matthen endorses that view in his Seeing, Doing and Knowing: A Philosophical 
Theory of Sense Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
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sees the hook on the right. This has to be accounted for somehow. Some, but by no means 
all, Unifiers are willing to concede that specular experiences are illusory. Their view is 
sometimes called ‘specular illusionism’.5 To the contrary, no illusion needs to be involved in 
specular experiences according to Multipliers. On their view, such experiences concern 
entities — i.e., images — other than the ordinary, material ones. They can be correctly seen 
as possessing spatial properties that are simply unlike those of ordinary objects (even 
though it is perfectly compatible to say that we see an image and undergo an illusion).6 The 
loss of metaphysical sobriety inherent in positing extra entities beyond those existing on our 
side of the mirror is counterbalanced by eschewing specular illusionism. Having thus 
introduced images in their ontology, Multipliers can put them to good use. It is entirely 
natural for them to further contend that the images we perceive in mirrors belong to the 
same family as those we see when looking at figurative paintings, just as Leonardo claimed. 
This provides them with a clear template clarifying the metaphysical status of mirror images. 
At no extra cost, they can also account for what is seen in paintings showing non-existing 
objects, such as Bruegel’s Landscape with the fall of Icarus. Whereas Icarus does not exist, 
it would be hard to deny that Icarus’ image is there to be seen. Their view fully vindicates 
Leonardo’s claim on paintings and mirrors quoted above.  
 
Casati aims at having his cake and eating it too. He is a Unifier, thus helping himself to 
metaphysical sobriety, and also wants to avoid paying the price of specular illusionism. His 
argument consists of two parts. First, he attempts to show that no illusion is involved in, e.g., 
Captain Hook’s seeing himself in a mirror with a hook on his right arm. Second, he argues 
that what appears to be the Multiplier’s strongest asset — i.e., the similarity between mirrors 
and paintings as to what they show — is itself illusory. We shall only examine the second half 
of his argument.7  
 
5 Maarten Steenhagen, “False Reflections,” Philosophical Studies 174/5 (2017), 1227–1242: 1227. 
6 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this point.  
7 A few words about the strategy of the first part of Casati’s argument are in order here. Casati claims that an illusion 
occurs only if we conceive of our perception as epistemically innocent, that is, if we assume that, in principle, pure visual 
perception could be entirely divested of any admixture of belief and other cognitive attitudes. If, to the contrary, we are 
aware of what is going on in our encounters with mirrors, we see that our right hand appears to us in the mirror precisely 





Let us once more state Leonardo’s and the Multiplier’s main claim: 
 
LEONARDO’S CLAIM In mirrors we see images like those we see in paintings. 
 
It is useful at this point to note that Leonardo’s claim is perfectly compatible with a different 
analogy that was first used by Leon Battista Alberti and was immediately and enthusiastically 
endorsed by every other artist in Italian Renaissance. Famously, Alberti claimed that painters 
should consider the frame of the painting as an open window:  
 
Let me tell you what I do when I am painting. First of all, on the surface on which I am 
going to paint, I draw a rectangle of whatever size I want, which I regard as an open 
window through which the subject to be painted is seen; and I decide how large I wish 
the human figures in the painting to be.8  
 
One can easily see that Leonardo’s analogy is entirely compatible with Alberti’s by 
considering two epoch making visual experiments by Filippo Brunelleschi. In the first 
experiment, following the newly discovered rules of linear perspective, he painted on a panel 
(now lost) a view of San Giovanni baptistery in Florence as seen from the cathedral. Then he 
made a hole in the panel and put a mirror in front of it. As Brunelleschi’s biographer Antonio 
Manetti reports,  
 
 
ease that permeates our experience of shaving while looking at our own face in the mirror. The belief that we are looking 
at a mirror penetrates the content of specular experiences. The upshot of Casati’s account is that our experiences with 
mirrors is unlike the Mueller-Lyer experience, which is cognitively impenetrable, even though we are sometimes fooled by 
mirrors. According to his unifying account, the experience of looking at things in mirrors is much the same as that of 
looking at them through spectacles. Objections have been levelled to Casati’s argument, the main one being that the 
illusion involved in locating an object on the other side of a mirror, much like the Mueller-Lyer one, does not go away by 
merely keeping in mind that one is facing a mirror. As Austen Clarke (1996: 490) puts it in his “Three Varieties of Visual 
Field,” Philosophical Psychology 9/4 (1996): 477–495, ‘Perhaps we aren't fooled, but our eyes are. Irresistibly they are in 
the grip of an image.’ (490). It has to be mentioned that the idea that mirror appearances per se are illusory remains 
controversial. Steenhagen, “False Reflections,” argues that mirrors do not convey any illusion of location. Mirrors merely 
allow us to see things by looking in directions other than those where they are. For instance, when I see my reflection, I 
see myself as occupying a location (my current location) that is not in the direction of my sight. 
8 Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting, trans. by C. Grayson, with an Introduction and notes by M. Kemp, (New York: Penguin 
Classics, 1435/1991): I, 19. 
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The hole was as tiny as a lentil bean on the painted side and it widened conically like a 
woman’s straw hat to about the circumference of a ducat or a bit more on the reverse 
side. He required that whoever wanted to look at it place his eye on the reverse side 
where the hole was large, and while bringing the hole up to his eye with one hand, to 
hold a flat mirror with the other hand in such a way that the painting would be reflected 
in it. […]. With the aforementioned elements […] the spectator felt he saw the actual 
scene when he looked at the painting. I have had it in my hands and seen it many times 
in my days, so I can testify to it.9  
In a second and equally successful experiment, in order to compare the accuracy of his 
image (also lost) with the real object, Brunelleschi placed his drawing next to a mirror 
reflecting the building. The observers saw the striking similarity between the drawing and the 
mirror image. Those two experiments show that a painted image can engender the illusion of 
looking at ‘the real thing’ as seen both from a window (the hole) and also as reflected in a 
mirror, if the similarity exceeds a certain threshold. This proves that Alberti!s analogy 
between paintings and the view through an open window is compatible with Leonardo!s 
analogy between paintings and mirror images.10 
 
Casati claims that, precisely because what can be seen through a window resembles what 
can be seen in a mirror, they are both unlike painted images. As many psychologists and 
philosophers have remarked, an all-important difference between mirrors and windows on 
the one hand and paintings on the other is that what we see in, or through, the former is 
sensitive to every movement of the observer, however small, whereas images shown by 
paintings do not substantially change as the observer moves relative to them.11 Thus, mirrors 
 
9 Antonio Manetti, The Life of Brunelleschi, ed. H. Saalman, trans. by C. Enggas, (University Park: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1970), 44. 
10 According to Samuel Y. Edgerton, Brunelleschi’s experiments marked an event which ultimately was to change the 
course of Western history (cf. The Mirror, the Window & the Telescope: How Renaissance Linear Perspective Changed Our 
Vision of the Universe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975). See also Michael Kubovy, The Psychology of Perspective 
and Renaissance Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 27.  
11 Usually, as we move relative to windows and mirrors, objects become visible that were out of sight before. This is clearly 
not so with pictures, even though they do look different to us, to some extent, as we move. The latter kind of changes are 




are like windows and unlike paintings in this respect. Note that the aforementioned contrast 
does not pertain to metaphysics. Metaphysically, mirror images side with painted images in 
so far as they are purely virtual objects, whereas through windows we see ordinary, material 
objects.12 Rather, the contrast highlighted by Casati is phenomenological in kind as it 
concerns what our visual experiences present to us.13 
 
Consider what happens when you trace on a window pane the profile of an object lying on 
the other side of the window itself: 
 
The smallest change in point of view causes a loss of alignment between the 
profile traced on the window and the visual profile of the thing to be represented. 
Indeed here lies the fundamental difference between images and windows. 
Windows do not function as images given that what is seen within a window 
changes according to adjustments of point of view, whereas what is seen by 
means of an image resists adjustment of point of view. But for this same reason 
mirrors do not function like images either, given that what is seen within a mirror 
changes in a way regulated by adjustments of point of view.14  
 
 
is that, when we look at a picture from an oblique angle, we don’t see the depicted scene as distorted even though the 
projection of a depicted object on our retina is very different from the way it is when we look at the picture head on. The 
perception of pictures from an oblique angle is a widely discussed topic in the psychology of picture perception. At least 
the following works are to be mentioned in this connection: Dhanraj Vishwanath, Ahna R Girshick and Martin S Banks, 
“Why Pictures Look Right When Viewed from the Wrong Place,” Nature Neuroscience 8 (2005): 1401–1410; James E. 
Cutting, “Rigidity in Cinema Seen from the Front Row, Side Aisle,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance 13 (1987): 323–334; E. Bruce Goldstein, “Spatial layout, Orientation Relative to the Observer, and 
Perceived Projection in Pictures Viewed at an Angle.” Journal of Experimental Psychology Human Perceptual Performance 
13 (1987): 256–266; Thomas O. Halloran, “Picture Perception is Array Specific: Viewing Angle versus Apparent 
Orientation.” Perception and Psychophysics 45 (1989): 467–482; Maurice Henri Pirenne, Optics, Painting, and Photography  
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970); Michael Polanyi, “What is a Painting?”, British Journal of Aesthetics 10 
(1970): 225–236;  Richard Wollheim, “Seeing-as, Seeing-in, and Pictorial Representation.” In Art and its Object, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge University Press, 1980), 205–226; Matthen Seeing, Doing and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense 
Perception, 315ff. We are indebted to Bence Nanay, “Threefoldness,” Philosophical Studies 175 (2018): 163–182 on this 
point. 
12 Mohan Matthen makes much of that metaphysical similarity, See “Ephemeral Vision,” in Perceptual Ephemera, ed. T. 
Crowther and C. Mac Cumhaill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 312-336: 321ff. 
13 See Casati, “Mirrors, Illusions and Epistemic Innocence,” 198f. 





The fundamental difference between seeing in an image and seeing in a mirror 
was given by phenomenology: the robustness of what is seen in the image was 
contrasted with the transience of what is seen using a mirror. If I move from right 
to left relative to the picture of Uncle Sam, his threatening finger continues to 
point at me; but if I move to the left or right of an immobile Uncle Sam that I see 
through a mirror, I can escape his pointing gesture.15  
 
In a nutshell, since what we see in a mirror or through a window pane is sensitive to the point 
of view whereas an image such as that drawn on a mirror, a pane, or a canvas, is not, what 
we see in a mirror or through a window is not an image. More in detail, Casati’s argument, 
applied to mirrors, can be rephrased as consisting of the following steps. 
 
1. Suppose we paint on a mirror the image of an object reflected by the mirror in 
such a way that the image appears to us — as we stand perfectly still in front of the 
mirror — exactly like the object reflected. Call the image we have painted on the mirror, 
a.  
2. As we move relative to the mirror — i.e., as our point of view changes — what 
we see in the mirror changes, but image a on the mirror looks no different, so that the 
similarity between the mirror-reflection and the image is lost.  
3. More abstractly, in circumstances C1, what we see in the mirror appears to be 
indistinguishable from image a. But, in circumstances C2, they are clearly 
distinguishable. So, they are not one and the same. 
4. Therefore, what we see in the mirror is not identical to that image a — or to any 
other image, since the same experience can easily be repeated for any image 




15 Casati, “Mirrors, Illusions and Epistemic Innocence,” 198f. 
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Before showing that the argument is flawed, let us point out that it bears a close 
resemblance to some arguments given by George Berkeley and Bertrand Russell, that have 
been exposed by other philosophers. After pointing out that a drop of blood appears 
uniformly red viewed with the naked eye, but will appear to consist of red particles 
suspended in a clear fluid when viewed through a microscope, Berkeley concludes, first, 
‘That either the appearance of objects to the naked eye or their appearance through the 
microscope is illusory’ and, second and more strongly, that ‘From all this, should it not seem 
to follow, that all colours are equally apparent, and that none of those which we perceive are 
really inherent in any outward object’.16 After David Armstrong, this is known as the argument 
from microscopes.  
 
Russell applied much the same argument to other visually perceived properties. For 
example, if we look at the texture of the surface of a table top with the naked eye we see the 
grain, ‘but otherwise the table looks smooth and even.’ If we look at it through a microscope, 
instead, ‘we should see roughnesses and hills and valleys, and all sorts of differences that 
are imperceptible to the naked eye.’ Then he goes on to ask which of these is the ‘real’ table. 
‘We are naturally tempted to say that what we see through the microscope is more real, but 
that in turn would be changed by a still more powerful microscope. If, then, we cannot trust 
what we see with the naked eye, why should we trust what we see through a microscope?’17 
 
In order to see the similarity of Berkeley’s and Russell’s argument to Casati’s one, consider 
the following: From the fact that in circumstances C1 – i.e., as seen with naked eye – the 
color of a drop of blood appears to be indistinguishable from red whereas in other 
circumstances, C2, the color of the same drop of blood appears to be mainly of no color at 
all, it is concluded that the drop of blood cannot be red. This closely matches step 3 above 
in our rephrasing of Casati’s argument. Berkeley’s further conclusion that all colors are 
 
16 George Berkeley, First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists in Principles of 
Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues, edited with an Introduction and Notes by H. Robinson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996); David Armstrong, “Colour Realism and the Argument from Microscopes,” In Contemporary Philosophy in 
Australia, ed. R. Brown and C. D. Rollins (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), 301–323; David Hilbert, Color and Color 
Perception. A Study in Anthropocentric Realism (Stanford: CSLI Lecture Notes, 1987). 
17 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Digireads.com Publishing, 1912/2018): 7. 
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equally apparent matches step 4. To stress the analogy between the two arguments further, 
let us remark that Berkeley concludes that colours are not real – while Casati concludes that 
nothing we see in a mirror is a real image.  
 
Berkeley’s argument cannot establish its intended conclusion. One can counter, for instance, 
that objects can possess many perceived and unperceived colours, or that there is an 
epistemologically privileged set of circumstances, i.e., the ‘normal conditions’, for issuing 
perceptual judgements, or that, without being illusory or mistaken, perceptual properties are 
always relative to a number of factors (and thus are relations, rather than properties). 
However, one can supplement Berkeley’s argument with some additional premise, relying on 
apparently obvious facts pertaining to perception of color. One such additional premise, 
which Berkeley did not bother to mention, is that an object cannot consistently have both the 
color property of being red all over and that of being (mainly) transparent all over. But even if 
this premise was added, the argument would still not be sufficient to bring home the point — 
as pointed out by David Hilbert, who claims that the argument is irredeemably flawed.18 But 
in any case, what interests us is that, for Casati’s argument, no comparable premise is even 
in sight.  
 
Be that as it may, to see that Casati’s argument is not valid, a simple modal argument 
suffices. In actual history, in 1773, the Postmaster General was indistinguishable from 
Benjamin Franklin, simply because Benjamin Franklin was the Postmaster General. Surely 
someone other than Benjamin Franklin could have been the Postmaster General in the same 
year. Thus, the Postmaster General, in counterfactual circumstances, would be clearly 
distinguishable from Benjamin Franklin. This obviously has no tendency to show that the 
Postmaster General was not Benjamin Franklin in actual fact. Note that ‘the Postmaster 
General’ is a definite description, just like ‘what is seen in a mirror’. On the other hand, 
‘Benjamin Franklin’ and ‘that image’ are rigid designators (a proper name and a 
demonstrative, respectively). We can conclude that Casati’s argument, purporting to show 
 
18 Hilbert, Color and Color Perception.  
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that what is seen in a mirror is no image, cannot be valid, as its form is the same as that of 
the modal argument above, which is clearly flawed.  
 
It might be objected that we equivocate on the term ‘indistinguishable’: it is one thing to say 
that an image is indistinguishable from another, and quite another that Benjamin Franklin is 
indistinguishable from the Postmaster General. In the latter case, we mean that the two 
terms — ‘Benjamin Franklin’ and ‘the Postmaster General’ — are co-referential, i.e., that 
Benjamin Franklin is identical to the Postmaster General. In the former, we simply mean that 
two distinct images are very similar — yet not identical — to one another. 
 
Of course, we agree that two images being perceptually indistinguishable is not the same 
thing as two objects being identical. However, the latter entails the former. In actual 
circumstances, Benjamin Franklin was the same individual as the Postmaster General. Being 
the same individual, a fortiori he was perceptually indistinguishable from it. It is generally 
agreed that any individual resembles itself. In any case, we do not even have to resort to the 
notion of resemblance, as Leibniz Law suffices: if A is identical to B, then A and B share all 
properties and hence are indistinguishable. If A and B are indistinguishable, then they are 
perceptually indistinguishable.  
 
To recap, the following are all true: 
 
1. Benjamin Franklin = Postmaster General in possible world w1, 
2. Benjamin Franklin is indistinguishable from Postmaster General in possible world w1 
[by Leibniz Law], 
3. Benjamin Franklin is perceptually indistinguishable from Postmaster General in 
possible world w1, [logic of adverbs], 
4. Benjamin Franklin ≠ Postmaster General in possible world w2, 
5. Benjamin Franklin is distinguishable from Postmaster General in possible world w2 
[by the (controversial) converse to Leibniz Law or, more simply, by the commonsensical 




However, it is false that  
 
6. Benjamin Franklin ≠ Postmaster General in possible world w1 [(6) is the negation of 
(1)]. 
 
This proves that Casati’s argument is fallacious. From the fact that something (the color of a 
blood drop, resp. what is seen in a mirror) is indistinguishable in some circumstances C1 but 
not in other circumstances C2 from something else (the color red, resp. the image drawn on 
the mirror), it cannot be concluded that they are not the same thing in the former 
circumstances.  
 
This is only part of the whole story. A further fallacy is involved in arguing that what is seen in 
a mirror cannot be any image at all (not just the one we have drawn) since the same 
reasoning can be repeated for what is seen in a mirror and any other image. We can easily 
grant that, as we move relative to the mirror, the object reflected loses its similarity to the 
image we have drawn. But at any given moment, in any other position, we could draw – if we 
were given enough time and dexterity – another image that would be indistinguishable from 
what we would then see in the mirror.  
 
A parallel can further clarify the issue. After pointing out that, in some counterfactual 
circumstances, the first Postmaster General would not be Benjamin Franklin, one might want 
further to conclude that, therefore, the General Postmaster is distinct from any human being, 
since, for every human being, the same reasoning about Franklin could be duplicated, i.e., 
circumstances could be found in which the first General Postmaster would not be that 
human being. But this is clearly absurd.  
 
Have we been unfair to Casati? Have we represented his argument inaccurately? One could 
perhaps read him differently, suggesting that Casati builds on a widely accepted observation, 
according to which the peculiarity of images consists in the fact that what you see in them is 
not sensitive to the position of the observer and does not, in consequence, change with the 
angle of observation. His argument would then proceed as follows: If something is an image, 
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then what you can see by means of it is perspective independent, i.e., is insensitive to 
changes in the observer’s position. What one sees in a mirror, on the other hand, is sensitive 
to changes in the observer’s position. From this, it immediately follows that what you see in a 
mirror is not an image, or is not seen by means of an image.19  
 
It is debatable that the argument so reconstructed really is distinct from the one that we 
ascribed to Casati above. For, what does perspective independence amount to? An image is 
perspective independent in so far as it would look the same in counterfactual circumstances, 
i.e. if one stepped aside and looked at it from a different point of view. Step 2, in our rendering 
of Casati’s argument above, exploits precisely this difference in counterfactual behaviour 
between images and what is seen in mirrors. Be that as it may, we surmise that it still is 
invalid. Let us note, first of all, that Pirenne’s observation is itself in need of some clarification. 
For one thing, it holds only with qualifications. The appearances of some very large and 
uniform objects — such as the surface of the sea — and of some uniform ones of any size — 
such as spheres — do not really change as you move relative to them. In the opposite 
direction, some images (e.g., tilt cards or wiggle pictures — i.e., images on grooved surfaces 
produced by lenticular printing — and those on spherical surfaces) appear quite different 
depending on the viewpoint. Second, one has to be careful as to what one takes images to 
be. In no sense are the material objects — such as a painted canvas or a photo — on which 
the image lies, peculiar within the large realm of all material objects. If you appreciably move 
relative to them, their appearances change depending on the angle from which you look at 
them. Thus, Pirenne’s observation only holds for images considered as (very roughly) what 
you see on flat surfaces such as canvases and photos.  
 
Now, barring the exceptions noted above, could Pirenne’s observation be used to give a 
direct argument settling what kind of entities are that are seen in mirrors? If it were possible, 
we would have some test along the following lines: if what is seen in a mirror is perspective 
independent then it is an image. Otherwise, i.e., if what you see in it depends on the angle 
 
19 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this reading to us.  
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from which you look at it, it is some other kind of entity, possibly a material object as the 
Unifier claims. 
 
We very much doubt that any such test can be given. Imagine a book with an illustrated cover 
reflected in a mirror. The book as a material object will appear quite different, depending on 
your viewpoint. The image on the cover, on the other hand, (or, what you see in it) is 
perspective independent. The test would therefore yield conflicting results. But of course an 
assumption implicit not just in Casati’s work but in the whole literature on the issue, is that 
there is only one kind of entity that is to be seen in mirrors.    
 
As a final remark, let us point out that Casati seems to be victim of a false analogy that 
results from a one-sided diet of examples. He only takes into consideration static images, 
such as paintings or photos. By modifying the example and taking into consideration 
dynamic images that are sensitive to the observer’s position and the relevant aspects of her 
environment, we might get a better grip on the limits of his argument. Imagine someone 
watches a video that is displayed on a big screen in front of her. The video was shot by a 
cameraperson as she was walking through an apartment. The person who watches the video 
sees a dynamic pictorial representation of the apartment. The continual changes in the 
image are sensitive to the movements of the cameraperson and the resulting changes of the 
camera’s perspective. Now, imagine a second scenario in which the same screen does not 
display a video, but a close-to-perfect Virtual-Reality projection of the same apartment that is 
sensitive to the observer’s bodily movements and to changes in her perspective. If Casati’s 
argument were correct, we should have to conclude that the video, but not the VR-
projection, is an image; for the latter, but not the former, is sensitive to changes in the 
observer’s perspective. This conclusion seems counter-intuitive, though, as both the VR-
projection and the video are displayed on the same screen in a way that is sufficiently 
similar. Hence, if one is willing to grant that the video is a pictorial representation, one should 
also admit, pace Casati, that the VR-projection is a pictorial representation, as well, which, in 
turn, entails that sensitivity to the observer’s perspective is not a symptom for a categorical 
difference between the two representations, video and VR-projection, respectively. One 
might still wonder whether the video is, in fact, a pictorial representation; one might argue 
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that it is transparent and allows the observer to directly perceive the apartment. We cannot 
settle this complex question here; our discussion merely aims to show that Casati’s 
argument does not succeed in supporting the claim that there is a categorical difference 
between mirror reflections and images. This is not to say that Leonardo’s Claim is fully 
established as correct. Even less is it sufficient to rule out that what we see in mirrors are the 
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